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INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
20051 (“BAPCPA”) was signed into law on April 20, 2005,2 and 
became effective six months later.3  Congress’ stated rationale for 
BAPCPA “is to improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring 
personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and 
ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”4  However, 
critics have charged Congress, despite their decades-long effort,5 with 
impure motives, sloppy draftsmanship leading to inconsistencies and 
confusion,6 and “arrogant disregard for the facts about debt and debtors 
in bankruptcy.”7
The creation of a new group, “debt relief agencies,”8 and the 
corresponding provisions regulating their behavior, may be the most 
baffling.9  A debt relief agency is a person that provides bankruptcy 
assistance to an assisted person in exchange for consideration.10  These 
 1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 2. Id. 
 3. UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE & RULES BOOKLET 5 (LegalPub.com, Inc. 
2006). 
 4. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89. 
 5. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 571 (2005). 
 6. Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was Advertised, 24 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1 (2005); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of 
Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2005); Catherine E. 
Vance & Corinne Cooper, Nine Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New 
Bankruptcy Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 283, 284 (2005). 
 7. Lundin, supra note 6, at 1. 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2007). 
 9. See id. §§ 526-528. 
 10. Id. § 101(12A).  “Debt relief agency” means: 
[A]ny person who provides any bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return 
for the payment of money or other valuable consideration, or who is a bankruptcy 
petition preparer under section 110, but does not include-- (A) any person who is an 
officer, director, employee, or agent of a person who provides such assistance or of 
the bankruptcy petition preparer; (B) a nonprofit organization . . . ; (C) a creditor of 
such assisted person . . . ; (D) a depository institution . . . ; (E) an author, publisher, 
distributor, or seller of works subject to copyright protection . . . . 
Id.  “Bankruptcy assistance” means: 
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requirements have sparked a two-part debate: whether attorneys fall 
within the definition of debt relief agencies,11 and if so, whether an 
application of these regulations on lawyers as a class violates their First 
Amendment rights.12
Attorneys should not be included in the definition of debt relief 
agencies.  A contrary ruling notwithstanding, the following provisions 
should be held unconstitutional: (1) § 526(a)(4), which prohibits debt 
relief agencies from advising assisted persons to incur more debt;13 (2) § 
527, which requires attorneys to make specific statements to their 
clients;14 (3) § 528, which regulates debt relief agency advertisement;15 
and (4) § 526(a)(1), which mandates attorneys to perform specific 
indicated services.16
[A]ny goods or services sold or otherwise provided to an assisted person with the 
express or implied purpose of providing information, advice, counsel, document 
preparation, or filing, or attendance at a creditors’ meeting or appearing in a case or 
proceeding on behalf of another or providing legal representation with respect to a 
case or proceeding under this title. 
Id. § 101(4A) (2007).  “Assisted person” means “any person whose debts consist 
primarily of consumer debts and the value of whose nonexempt property is less than 
$164,250.” Id. § 101(3). 
 11. Compare Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 
767-69 (D. Minn. 2006) (finding the debt relief agency provisions of BAPCPA 
inapplicable to attorneys), and In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 
B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) (holding that attorneys are not debt relief agencies), 
with Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 22-23 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that 
attorneys are debt relief agencies), and Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 911-12 (D. Or. 
2006) (stating that attorneys are debt relief agencies). 
 12. Each court that has found attorneys to be debt relief agencies has also held 
some or all of the challenged sections to be unconstitutional. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 23-
27 (holding that § 526(a)(4) violates the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, but that § 
527 does not unconstitutionally compel speech); Olsen, 350 B.R. at 915-21 
(determining that § 526(a)(4) was both under-inclusive and over-inclusive in violation 
of the First Amendment, but declining to find other challenged provisions 
unconstitutional); Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 22-24 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding that 
§ 526(a)(4) is facially unconstitutional), aff’d sub nom. Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660 
(D. Conn. 2007). 
 13. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2005). 
 14. Id. § 527. 
 15. Id. § 528. 
 16. Id. § 526(a)(1). 
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I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Legislative History 
BAPCPA arose from the lobbying efforts of a coalition of 
consumer lenders, who “convinced Congress that abuse was rampant in 
bankruptcy, that many debtors were using bankruptcy as a ‘first resort’ 
to avoid paying creditors, and that courts weren’t doing enough to police 
the bankruptcy system.”17  Congress rationalized that BAPCPA would 
restore integrity to the bankruptcy system and protect both creditors and 
debtors.18  Congress also singled out attorneys as a major abuser of the 
bankruptcy system,19 and purported that the amendments would curb 
such behavior.20
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, one of the most ardent supporters of 
the “debtor’s bill of rights,” intentionally struck at attorneys when 
addressing the Senate in favor of section 256 of BAPCPA:21 “Some 
attorneys . . . leave out the part about the years of ruined credit that 
result, the inability to get a car loan or a house loan.”22  Senator Hatch 
noted that BAPCPA sought to end incomplete and sometimes incorrect 
information provided by attorneys to their clients.23  Congress also 
highlighted attorney abuse, or “gaming” of the system, as a factor in 
support of bankruptcy reform.24
 17. Lundin, supra note 6, at 1 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 5-8 (2005), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92-95). 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92-
95). 
 19. Congress never presented any evidence in support of their accusations of these 
egregious abuses.  “Without a shred of evidence, BAPCPA convicts debtors’ attorneys 
as conspirators in an ‘abusive’ bankruptcy system.” Lundin, supra note 6, at 69. 
 20. 151 CONG. REC. S2459-01 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(“We all know about the abuses of the system.  Well, that is about to change for the 
better.  This bill is about fairness and accountability. . . . This bill contains a debtor’s 
bill of rights with new protections that prevent bad actors from preying on the 
uninformed.”). Id. 
 21. The section numbers of BAPCPA do not necessarily correspond to the section 
numbers of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 22. 151 CONG. REC. S2459-01 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
92-95. 
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[T]he present bankruptcy system has loopholes and incentives that 
allow and—sometimes—even encourage opportunistic personal 
filings and abuse. . . . [The Justice Department] has ‘consistently 
identified’ such problems as ‘debtor misconduct and abuse, 
misconduct by attorneys and other professionals, problems 
associated with bankruptcy petition preparers, and instances where a 
debtor’s discharge should be challenged.’25
The courts that have held that attorneys are debt relief agencies have 
relied on this evidence of legislative intent.26
A failed proposal by Senator Feingold provides another relevant 
piece of legislative history.  On March 9, 2005, Senator Feingold 
proposed, as part of amendment No. 93,27 that the definition for debt 
relief agencies exclude attorneys.28  However, the Senate did not pass, or 
even address, his proposal.29  Although Congress turned down the 
opportunity to resolve the definition of attorneys as debt relief agencies, 
Congress did not reject BAPCPA, leaving the inclusion of attorneys an 
issue of contention. 
Some legislative history suggests intent to exclude attorneys from 
the term “debt relief agency.”  In certain parts, the Congressional Record 
includes both attorneys and debt relief agencies on the same list.30  
Additionally, the requirements for attorneys in the legislative history do 
not include the responsibilities mandated in 11 U.S.C. §§ 526-528 for 
debt relief agencies.31  Courts, especially those that heard challenges to 
the debt relief agency provisions as an issue of first impression in their 
 25. Id. (emphasis added). 
 26. See Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 23 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that 
Congress mentioned “attorneys” 164 times in the House Report on BAPCPA); Olsen v. 
Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 912 (D. Or. 2006) (weighing the legislative history to 
determine that attorneys are debt relief agencies). 
 27. Robert Wann, Jr., Note, “Debt Relief Agencies:” Does the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention And Consumer Protection Act of 2005 Violate Attorneys’ First Amendment 
Rights?, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 273, 281 n.37 (2006).  
 28. See 151 CONG. REC. S2306-02, 2316-17 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Feingold); see also Wann, supra note 27, at 281 n.37.(discussing Congress’ failure 
to adopt the Feingold amendment as support for the argument that attorneys are debt 
relief agencies). 
 29. Wann, supra note 27, at 281 n.37. 
 30. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 34 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
92-95). (“S[ection] 256 would impose private-sector mandates . . . on bankruptcy 
attorneys . . . [and] debt-relief agencies . . . .”). Id. 
 31. See id. at 44. 
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jurisdictions, paid close attention to the legislative history of 
BAPCPA.32
B . Scholarly Treatment Pre-Implementation 
After passage but prior to implementation of BAPCPA, scholars, 
sparked by the ambiguous legislative history, addressed the inevitable 
problems that courts would face under the new law.33  Scholarly articles 
published prior to BAPCPA implementation assumed that debtors’ 
attorneys fall within the definition of “debt relief agencies.”34  Some of 
these articles also addressed the applicability of 11 U.S.C. §§ 526-528 to 
other attorneys (i.e., attorneys who do not or only rarely represent 
debtors), and argued that the statutory language applied to all attorneys 
involved in bankruptcy, not just debtor’s attorneys.35
Despite the failure to question whether attorneys are, in fact, debt 
relief agencies, most of the pre-implementation articles addressed the 
constitutional and practical issues posed by BAPCPA.36  These issues 
varied from the regulation of advertising,37 to the constitutionality of § 
 32. See Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 22-23 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Olsen v. 
Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 911-12 (D. Or. 2006); In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief 
Agencies, 332 B.R. 66, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) (discussing Congressional intent). 
 33. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5; Lundin, supra note 6; Sommer, supra note 6; 
Vance, supra note 6. 
 34. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 572 (failing to question whether attorneys 
are debt relief agencies: “BAPCPA requires consumer bankruptcy lawyers to identify 
themselves in advertisements as ‘debt relief agencies’”); Lundin, supra note 6, at 69 
(denouncing the unjustified conviction of debtors’ attorneys and discussing the de-
professionalization of bankruptcy attorneys as debt relief agencies); Sommer, supra 
note 6, at 206 (assuming that the provisions applying to debt relief agencies would 
apply to bankruptcy attorneys); Vance, supra note 6, at 292 (assuming that debtors’ 
attorneys are debt relief agencies). 
 35. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 576 (explaining how §§ 526-528 could apply 
to attorneys representing creditors and landlords because the definition of “assisted 
person” is not limited to debtors or prospective debtors); Sommer, supra note 6, at 206 
(stating that the “slipshod drafting” of BAPCPA means that the provisions applying to 
debt relief agencies “will apply to many attorneys who rarely, or never, represent 
consumer bankruptcy debtors”); Vance, supra note 6, at 293 (questioning whether 
BAPCA will also regulate creditors’ attorneys). 
 36. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 572-89; Sommer, supra note 6, at 
207-11; Wann, supra note 27, at 283-99 (forecasting constitutional issues which, while 
written post-implementation, had not yet been litigated). 
 37. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 572-89 (evaluating the Supreme Court’s 
perspective on attorney advertising and discussing whether BAPCPA’s regulations on 
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526(a)(4) and § 528,38 to the potential for First Amendment violations.39  
Attorneys, judges and other members of the bankruptcy world were 
undoubtedly on notice of the potential conflict over 11 U.S.C. §§ 526-
528, prior to October 17, 2005, the effective date of BAPCPA. 
C.  Four Basic Cases Types40
To date, four distinct types of rulings have emerged:41 (1) cases 
holding that the plaintiffs have no standing;42 (2) cases holding that 
the content of advertising violate the constitution). 
 38. See Wann, supra note 27, at 283-99. 
 39. See Sommer, supra note 6, at 208 (indicating potential for violation of 
attorney’s First Amendment rights). 
 40. The cases described in this section focus on whether or not attorneys are debt 
relief agencies and on the constitutionality of these newly added provisions.  Other 
cases have also addressed debt relief agencies.  One court, while determining a different 
issue, mentioned debt relief agencies, assuming without discussion that attorneys are 
included in the definition. See In re Mendoza, 347 B.R. 34, 38 n.6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2006) (assuming that a debtor’s attorney is almost always a debt relief agency).  Other 
courts applied §§ 526-528, but did not specifically discuss the applicability of the 
provisions to attorneys. See In re Bernales, 345 B.R. 206 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006); 
Martini v. We The People Forms & Serv. Ctr. USA, Inc. (In re Barcelo), 313 B.R. 135 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2004).  Another court assumed for the purposes of resolving a 
different issue that attorneys are debt relief agencies, but recognized a split in authority, 
reserving the right to readdress the dispute in a controlling decision. See In re Chapter 
13 Fee Applications, No. 06-00305, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2710, at *17 n.7 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 3, 2006). 
 41. To date, courts have decided only eleven cases addressing the topic of debt 
relief agencies with regard to attorneys. See Geisenberger v. Gonzales, 346 B.R. 678 
(E.D. Pa. 2006); In re Gutierrez, 356 B.R. 496 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Hersh v. United States, 
347 B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 
B.R. 758 (D. Minn. 2006); Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906 (D. Or. 2006); Zelotes v. 
Martini, 352 B.R. 17 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660 
(D. Conn. 2007); In re Reyes, 361 B.R. 276 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); In re Robinson, 
368 B.R. 492 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Francis I. McCartney, 336 B.R. 588 (Bankr. 
M.D. Ga. 2006); In re Norman, No. 06-70859-A, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2925 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2006); In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. 66 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005). 
 42. See Geisenberger, 346 B.R. at 683; In re Francis I. McCartney, 336 B.R. at 
591-92. But see Jackson v. McDow (In re Jackson), No. 05-44941-B, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 68927, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2006) (holding that a debtor has standing to 
challenge whether the debt relief agency provisions apply to attorneys, so long as that 
challenge is brought as an adversary proceeding and not as a motion in a main 
proceeding). 
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attorneys are not debt relief agencies;43 (3) cases holding that attorneys 
are debt relief agencies, but that some or all of the provisions pertaining 
to debt relief agencies are unconstitutional as applied to attorneys;44 and 
(4) cases applying the debt relief agency provisions to attorneys, without 
formal discussion on the applicability of the provisions.45
The courts in Geisenberger v. Gonzales and In re Francis I. 
McCartney both held that they lack jurisdiction to decide whether 
attorneys are debt relief agencies.46  Both courts discussed the 
constitutional prohibition against delivery of advisory opinions,47 and 
determined that the motions by the plaintiffs amounted to little more 
than requests for such proscribed opinions; therefore, they could not 
hear the cases.48  The In re McCartney court noted that “no party has 
threatened to enforce against [plaintiff] the debt relief agency provisions 
of BAPCPA.”49  Without the enforcement, or the threat of enforcement, 
a court could not hear a case or controversy as required under Article III 
of the Constitution, and therefore could not determine whether attorneys 
are debt relief agencies.50
The courts in three cases determined that debtors’ attorneys are not 
debt relief agencies.51  These opinions forwarded four arguments as to 
why courts should construe the statute in this way:52 (1) plain language 
 43. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 767-68; In re Reyes, 361 B.R. at 279-80; In re 
Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. at 71. 
 44. Hersh, 347 B.R. at 23-27; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 915-21; Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 22-
25. 
 45. See In re Gutierrez, 356 B.R. 496; In re Robinson, 368 B.R. at 500 n.7 (briefly 
mentioning binding authority holding that attorneys are debt relief agencies and that the 
relevant provisions to that case were not unconstitutional); In re Norman, No. 06-
70859-A, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2925, at *11-*15, *21-*22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 
2006) (discussing debt relief agencies and their requirements with regard to attorneys, 
but assuming without discussion that attorneys are debt relief agencies and the 
provisions are constitutional). 
 46. See Geisenberger, 346 B.R. at 683; In re McCartney, 336 B.R. at 591-92. 
 47. See Geisenberger, 346 B.R. at 683; In re McCartney, 336 B.R. at 591. 
 48. See Geisenberger, 346 B.R. at 683; In re McCartney, 336 B.R. at 591. 
 49. 336 B.R. at 592. 
 50. See U.S. CONST. art. III; In re McCartney, 336 B.R. at 591 (quoting Preiser v. 
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975)). 
 51. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 768-69 
(D. Minn. 2006); In re Reyes, 361 B.R. 276, 279-80 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); In re 
Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. 66, 71 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005). 
 52. See infra Part III.B. 
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interpretation;53 (2) legislative intent;54 (3) the doctrine of absurd 
result;55 and (4) the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.56  The In re 
Reyes court adopted the opinion of Judge Rosenbaum from Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, holding that attorneys are not 
debt relief agencies.57  However, even if attorneys generally are debt 
relief agencies, attorneys who represent debtors in connection with pro 
bono work are not debt relief agencies.58  Additionally, the In re Reyes 
and Milavetz courts each held that §§ 526(a)(4), 528(a)(4) and (b)(2) are 
unconstitutional.59
The courts in Hersh v. United States, Olsen v. Gonzales, and 
Zelotes v. Martini also held that attorneys are debt relief agencies, but 
that many of the provisions applying to debt relief agencies are 
unconstitutional.60  All three courts held that § 526(a)(4) is 
unconstitutional as applied to attorneys.61  Olsen and Hersh both 
addressed the constitutionally of § 527, holding that the section, even as 
applied to attorneys, does not unconstitutionally compel speech.62  The 
Olsen court went one step further in its constitutional evaluation, 
discussing the viability of §§ 526(a)(1) and 528,63 but ultimately 
 53. See In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. at 69. 
 54. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 768; In re Reyes, 361 B.R. at 279 (adopting the 
opinion of Judge Rosenbaum in Milavetz); In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief 
Agencies, 332 B.R. at 69. 
 55. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 768; In re Reyes, 361 B.R. at 279 (adopting the 
opinion of Judge Rosenbaum in Milavetz); In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief 
Agencies, 332 B.R. at 69-70. 
 56. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 768; infra Part II.A.1. 
 57. See In re Reyes, 361 B.R. at 279. 
 58. See id. at 280-81; infra Part III.B. (discussing how the debt relief agency 
provisions affect non-debtor attorneys). 
 59. Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 763-67 (holding that if attorneys are debt relief agencies, 
§§ 526(a)(4), 528(a)(4) and (b)(2) violate their First Amendment right to free speech); 
In re Reyes, 361 B.R. at 279 (adopting the decision of Milavetz with regard to the 
constitutional challenges). 
 60. See Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Olsen v. Gonzales, 
350 B.R. 906 (D. Or. 2006); Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d sub 
nom., Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 61. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 23-25 (holding that § 526(a)(4) is not sufficiently 
narrow); Olsen, 350 B.R. at 916 (determining that “the regulation is both under-
inclusive and over inclusive”); Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 21-25 (holding that § 526(a)(4) is 
overbroad). 
 62. See Hersh, 347 B.R. 25-27; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 917-19. 
 63. See 350 B.R. at 916-17, 919-21. 
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determining that neither section violated the attorneys’ First Amendment 
rights.64
In re Gutierrez,65 In re Robinson,66 and In re Norman67 vary from 
the other three types of cases because they were not brought by attorneys 
seeking clarification about the statute, but rather were motions on other 
issues, the resolution of which required analysis of the debt relief agency 
provisions.68  These cases did not address whether attorneys are debt 
relief agencies, or the corresponding constitutional implications.69  
Rather, they merely applied the law to the factual situations presented.70  
These cases, in particular In re Gutierrez, affect arguments that attorneys 
may make about standing.71  Because a court has held an attorney liable 
under the debt relief agency provisions, one can argue that the threat of 
enforcement is not merely speculative. 
 64. See id. 
 65. 356 B.R. 496 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 66. 368 B.R. 492 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). 
 67. No. 06-70859-A, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2925 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2006). 
 68. See In re Gutierrez, 356 B.R. at 496 (debtor asserting claims against his former 
attorney, alleging violations of the debt relief agency provisions); In re Robinson, 368 
B.R. at 500 (determining whether supplemental compensation for the debtor’s attorney 
should be approved); In re Norman, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2925, at *11-*16 (determining 
whether the Chapter 13 Trustee was entitled to attorney-client documents under the debt 
relief agency provisions). 
 69. See In re Gutierrez, 356 B.R. at 496; In re Robinson, 368 B.R. at 500; In re 
Norman, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2925, at *11-*16. 
 70. See In re Gutierrez, 356 B.R. at 496; In re Robinson, 368 B.R. at 500; In re 
Norman, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2925, at *11-*16. 
 71. 356 B.R. at 469 (holding the debtor’s attorney liable under the debt relief 
agency provisions and sanctioned him).  This Note does not delve into the issue of 
standing, but several cases challenging the debt relief agency provisions have 
speculated on standing. Compare Geisenberger v. Gonzales, 346 B.R. 678, 683 (E.D. 
Pa. 2006) (refusing to hear the plaintiff attorney’s claims because he lacked standing), 
and In re Matter of Francis I. McCartney, 336 B.R. 588, 591 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) 
(holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and finding the court lacked jurisdiction), 
with Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 913-15 (D. Or. 2006) (continuing the 
proceedings after holding that the plaintiffs had standing), and Zelotes v. Martini, 352 
B.R. 17, 20-22 (D. Conn. 2006) (confirming that plaintiffs possessed standing). 
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II.  CONFLICT 
 
A.  Are Attorneys Debt Relief Agencies? 
Because the limited number of courts that have addressed whether 
attorneys are debt relief agencies disagree, the issue is unresolved.  
Section 101(12A) defines debt relief agencies,72 but its vagueness has 
led attorneys to question whether debtors’ attorneys are debt relief 
agencies.73  Although such challenges have been raised primarily with 
regard to debtors’ attorneys,74 the question whether attorneys who either 
do not represent debtors, or represent them pro bono, are also debt relief 
agencies, remains.75
1.  Debtors’ Attorneys 
Two courts have held that attorneys are not debt relief agencies, 
relying on the plain language of the statute.76  Section 101(12A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code “makes no direct reference to either ‘attorney’ or 
‘lawyer,’”77 and “as a matter of plain language, ‘attorney’ and ‘debt 
relief agency’ are not synonymous nor do they in common 
understanding include each other.”78  Similarly, this definition of debt 
relief agency makes specific reference to bankruptcy petition preparers, 
a group that specifically excludes attorneys,79 and omits precise 
reference to attorneys.80  “‘Attorney’ is separately defined in § 101(4), 
 
 72. See definitions cited supra note 10. 
 73. See Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 21 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Olsen, 350 B.R. 
at 910; Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 758 (D. Minn. 
2006); Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 19; In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 
B.R. 66, 67 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005). 
 74. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 21; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 910; Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 758; 
Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 19; In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. at 67. 
 75. See Olsen, 350 B.R. at 910 (beyond noting that one of the petitioners was not a 
bankruptcy attorney, the court did not otherwise distinguish the plaintiffs from one 
another); In re Reyes, 361 B.R. 276, 280-81 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 76. See Milavetz, 335 B.R. at 768; In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 
332 B.R. at 69. 
 77. Milavetz, 335 B.R. at 768. 
 78. In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. at 69. 
 79. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(1) (“‘[B]ankruptcy petition preparer’ means a person, other 
than an attorney for the debtor or an employee of such attorney under the direct 
supervision of such attorney . . . .”). 
 80. See Milavetz, 335 B.R. at 768; In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 
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which makes no reference to debt relief agencies or to subsection 
(12(A)).”81
Both courts also declined to read the statute in a way that would 
lead to an “absurd result.”82  If the definition of “debt relief agency” 
includes attorneys, attorneys must tell assisted persons (their clients or 
potential clients) that they have the right to hire an attorney or to 
represent themselves, and that only an attorney can render legal 
advice.83  “The interpretation of a statute that is logical or sensible is 
preferred over interpretation that is illogical or absurd.”84
The court in Milavetz also relied on the doctrine of statutory 
construction that strives to read a statute to avoid a finding of 
unconstitutionality.85  The doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
“counsels that, in construing a statute for ambiguity, the Court must opt 
for a construction which avoids grave constitutional questions.”86  The 
court concluded that clear ambiguity exists in the statute and 
constitutional avoidance requires that §§ 526-528 do not apply to 
attorneys.87  Because the court opined that the various provisions of 
BAPCPA governing debt relief agencies would be unconstitutional if 
applied to attorneys, it favored a construction of the statute that viewed 
the debt relief agency provisions as inapplicable to attorneys, thus 
avoiding a conclusion that §§ 526-528 are unconstitutional.88
The In re Attorneys at Law and Debt Relief Agencies court 
rationalized that because the definition of bankruptcy assistance,89 a 
vital element of the definition of debt relief agencies,90 includes the 
provision “legal representation,” Congress intended to exclude attorneys 
332 B.R. at 69. 
 81. In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. at 69. 
 82. See Milavetz, 335 B.R. at 768; In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 
332 B.R. at 69-70. 
 83. See 11 U.S.C. § 527(b); Milavetz, 335 B.R. at 768; In re Attorneys at Law & 
Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. at 69-70. 
 84. In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. at 70 (citing United 
States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1926)). 
 85. Milavetz, 335 B.R. at 768. 
 86. Id. (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988)). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 768. 
 89. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4A). 
 90. See id. § 101(12A). 
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from the definition of debt relief agencies.91  The court reasoned that 
Congress intended to create a federal statute to prevent the unauthorized 
practice of law, not to regulate attorneys.92  The court also stated that 
Congress made clear in § 526(d)(2) “that there is no effort to curtail the 
states’ role in enforcing ‘qualifications for the practice of law.’”93  
Because regulation of attorneys has traditionally been a matter of state 
law, application of the new provisions to attorneys would overstep 
previously established boundaries.94  Additionally, the court briefly 
mentioned that this potential infringement on the states’ right to regulate 
the practice of law would violate the Tenth Amendment.95
Despite the plain language reading, most courts find that debtors’ 
attorneys are debt relief agencies.96  To the extent they articulate their 
reasoning, courts generally find that attorneys fit within the definition of 
debt relief agencies because only attorneys are authorized to provide 
legal advice, and “providing legal advice” is part of the definition of 
bankruptcy assistance.97  Additionally, these courts reason that if 
 91. See In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 332 B.R. 66, 69 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ga. 2005). 
[T]he organized bar varies from state to state, is restricted by limited availability of 
resources, and often cannot occur in a time-sensitive period as to protect the 
consumer, [and] that the inclusion of the term ‘legal representation’ . . . was 
Congress’s effort to empower the Bankruptcy Courts presiding over a case with 
authority to protect consumers who [were] before the Court . . . . 
Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. at 70 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 526(d)(2)). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 71 (theorizing that if the debt relief agency provisions applied to 
attorneys, then the federal government might be violating the Tenth Amendment by 
infringing on the states’ right to control the practice of law); Chemerinsky, supra note 
5, at 582-83. 
 96. The reasoning is less detailed than the analysis provided by the two courts that 
found that debtor’s attorneys are not debt relief agencies, perhaps because scholars and 
other participants in the legislative process have assumed for some time that the 
legislation should (or could) be so construed. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
In fact, the court in Zelotes v. Martini did not discuss whether or not attorneys fit within 
the definition because the plaintiff, an attorney, claimed that he was a debt relief 
agency.  The court held that because the defendants did not raise the issue in their 
papers, it would assume that the plaintiff met the definition. 352 B.R. 17, 19 n.1 (D. 
Conn. 2006), aff’d sub nom., Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 97. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4A); Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 22-23 (N.D. 
Tex. 2006) (holding that attorneys also supply many of the other enumerated functions 
included in the definition of “bankruptcy assistance”); Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 
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Congress had intended to exclude attorneys from the definition of debt 
relief agencies, it would have done so explicitly.98  Congress never 
considered Senator Feingold’s amendment to BAPCPA, which would 
have created this exclusion.99  These courts view repeated references in 
legislative history that BAPCPA should protect consumer debtors from 
their attorneys100 as evidence that Congress anticipated the restrictions 
pertaining to debt relief agencies to apply to attorneys.101
2.  Other Attorneys 
Several scholars discussed the possibility that attorneys of other 
parties in bankruptcy, such as creditors and landlords, could also fall 
within the definition of debt relief agency.102  These scholars argued that 
the definition of “assisted person,” set out in § 101(4A), is not limited to 
debtors in a bankruptcy.103  Therefore, an individual creditor or landlord, 
or a defendant in an adversary proceeding, could be considered an 
“assisted person” and their attorney a debt relief agency.104  
Additionally, § 527(b) requires debt relief agencies to provide 
disclosures to represented debtors.105  This provision, however, only 
requires debt relief agencies to provide disclosures “to the extent 
applicable.”106  Consequently, Congress may have added this discretion-
granting phrase to protect attorneys from other parties to a bankruptcy. 
 
911-12 (D. Or. 2006). 
 98. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 23; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 912. 
 99. Olsen, 350 B.R. at 912; see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
 101. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 23 (noting that Congress mentioned “attorneys” 164 
times in the House Report on BAPCPA); Olsen, 350 B.R. at 912 (discussing the 
legislative history). 
 102. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 576; Sommer, supra note 6, at 204 
(mentioning that “those mostly likely to innocently violate the provisions will be 
attorneys who do not regularly represent consumer debtors”); Vance, supra note 6, at 
295-96. 
 103. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 576; Sommer, supra note 6, at 204, Vance, 
supra note 6, at 295-96.  Anyone whose debts consist primarily of consumer debts can 
be an assisted person.  The bankruptcy assistance provided need not be related to that 
person’s own debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4A). 
 104. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 576; Vance, supra note 6, at 294-96 (listing 
specific instances where a non-debtor could become an assisted person, rendering their 
attorney a debt relief agency). 
 105. 11 U.S.C. § 527(b). 
 106. Id.; see also infra Part II.C.2. 
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No court has ruled on whether the debt relief agency provisions 
apply to attorneys other than debtors’ attorneys.  The court in Hersh 
noted, however, that while the attorney in that case fell within the 
definition of debt relief agency, that “does not necessarily mean it 
applies to all attorneys.”107  McBride, one of the plaintiffs in Olsen, was 
not a debtors’ attorney.108  However, the court did not treat McBride 
differently from the other plaintiffs who were debtor attorneys, stating 
its belief that if attorneys are debt relief agencies, the definition includes 
all attorneys, not just debtor’s attorneys.109
Some scholars conclude that legislative intent would not render 
non-debtor’s attorneys debt relief agencies.110  Because Congress 
intended for BAPCPA to protect consumers from their attorneys, at least 
in part,111 it would not follow that Congress meant to extend the 
provisions to attorneys for other parties in bankruptcy.  One court 
addressed whether pro bono attorneys are debt relief agencies.112  The 
court held that because, by definition, a “debt relief agency” must 
provide “bankruptcy assistance . . . in return for the payment of money 
or other valuable consideration,”113 pro bono attorneys are not debt relief 
agencies.114  The court acknowledged that pro bono attorneys do receive 
a benefit from the representation—credit toward fulfilling the state pro 
bono requirement.115  Nonetheless, this benefit was not enough to 
constitute the necessary exchange of valuable consideration between the 
debtor and the attorney to fall within the definition of a debt relief 
agency.116  However, the government could argue as erroneous the 
adoption of a standard of valuable consideration mandating monetary 
exchange between the debtor and attorney.  Rather, the receipt of 
valuable consideration should only require that the attorney receive 
 107. Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 22 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 108. Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 910-11 (D. Or. 2006). 
 109. See id. at 919 (“[I]t does not appear that McBride is correct that he is required 
to give an untrue statement or not advertise his services regarding advising clients in 
areas of bankruptcy. . . . [S]ection 528 also permits a substantially similar statement . . . 
.”). 
 110. See Vance, supra note 6, at 293. 
 111. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
 112. See In re Reyes, 361 B.R. 276 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 113. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A). 
 114. See In re Reyes, 361 B.R. at 280-81. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
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consideration for services rendered, which can include credit toward a 
pro bono requirement. 
B.  Constitutional Considerations 
The conclusion that attorneys are debt relief agencies raises a host 
of constitutional issues, specifically First Amendment issues. 
1.  Section 526(a)(4) 
Section 526(a)(4) of the bankruptcy code raises the most 
uncertainty, which provides that 
[a] debt relief agency shall not advise an assisted person or 
prospective assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of 
such person filing a case under this title or to pay an attorney or 
bankruptcy petition preparer fee or charge for services performed as 
part of preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this 
title.117
Plaintiffs argue that compliance with this section prevents otherwise 
correct, lawful, and proper speech, violating their First Amendment right 
to free speech.118
a.  Applicable First Amendment Standard 
In any First Amendment challenge to a statute, the court must first 
determine which standard or level of scrutiny to apply, i.e., how 
valuable is the speech or the speaker’s right to make the speech, 
balanced against the government interest forwarded by the statute.119  
Challengers of § 526(a)(4) have based their claims on First Amendment 
principles.120  The courts have grappled with the difficult threshold issue 
of the applicable standard to apply to the evaluation of § 526(a)(4).121  
 
 117. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4). 
 118. See Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 21-22 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 762 (D. Minn. 2006); Olsen v. 
Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 910 (D. Or. 2006); Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 20 (D. 
Conn. 2006). 
 119. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 23 (discussing two issues—the applicable standard and 
constitutionality—the parties raised regarding § 526(a)(4)). 
 120. See id. at 23-24. 
 121. See id.; Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 763-66; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 915-16; Zelotes, 352 
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The outcome of this threshold issue directly affects whether a court will 
invalidate the statute with regard to attorneys. 
Defendants in constitutional challenges to § 526(a)(4) advocate for 
the lenient standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Gentile v. State 
Bar of Nevada.122  The disputed provision must serve “the State’s 
legitimate interest in regulating the activity in question” and “impose 
only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers’ speech.”123  This test 
arose out of the Supreme Court’s belief that the government has a 
“special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the 
licensed professions,”124 specifically a responsibility to impose ethical 
restrictions.125  Therefore, this standard applies where the challenged 
provision is an ethical rule.126  According to the court in Gentile, an 
ethical rule is designed to protect “the integrity and fairness” of the 
judicial system.127  The defendants in Olsen and Hersh argued that § 
526(a)(4) should be construed as an ethical rule, because it is “a tool for 
protecting the integrity and fairness of the bankruptcy system.”128  If a 
court determines that § 526(a)(4) constitutes an ethical rule, the more 
lenient Gentile standard will apply, making invalidation of the statute on 
First Amendment grounds more likely.129
However, a content-based restriction merits a higher standard of 
review.  The court in Milavetz rejected that the Gentile standard in favor 
of strict scrutiny.130  Under strict scrutiny, restrictions can only survive if 
they are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.131  The 
B.R. at 22. 
 122. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); see also Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 12-13, 
Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906 (D. Or. 2006) (No. 05-6365-HO) [hereinafter Olsen 
Brief]; Reply Brief in Support of Federal Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, Hersh v. 
United States, 347 B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (No. 3-05-CV-2330-N) [hereinafter Hersh 
Reply Brief]. 
 123. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). 
 124. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978). 
 125. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1073. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1075. 
 128. Olsen Brief, supra note 122, at 14; see also Hersh Reply Brief, supra note 122, 
at 2. 
 129. See U.S. v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 
140 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 130. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 764 (D. 
Minn. 2006). 
 131. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
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Milavetz court held that strict scrutiny should apply because § 526(a)(4) 
is a content-based regulation of attorney speech; it prevents attorneys 
from giving specific information to their clients.132  Strict scrutiny 
applies to content-based restrictions on speech because “‘[g]overnment 
action that stifles speech on account of its message . . . favored by the 
Government, contravenes th[e] essential [First Amendment] right[s]’ of 
private citizens.”133  In rejecting the Gentile standard,134 the court held 
that § 526(a)(4) is not an ethical rule.135  The court found that nothing in 
the section “alludes to ethics.”136  “The government ‘cannot foreclose 
the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels.’”137  This holding 
increases the likelihood that the statute, as applied to lawyers, will be 
invalidated on First Amendment grounds. 
Other courts that have addressed the constitutionality of § 526(a)(4) 
held that it is irrelevant which standard applies because the provision 
fails even under the more lenient Gentile standard.138
b.  Constitutionality 
In determining the constitutionality of § 526(a)(4), courts first look 
to the government’s interests under the statute.139  The rationale behind 
BAPCPA is well established: improve bankruptcy law by protecting 
creditors and debtors and preventing abuse of the system.140  Congress 
was concerned that attorneys were advising their clients to incur 
significant debt in the time preceding filing because the debt would be 
dischargeable, to the disadvantage of both creditors, whose distributions 
in bankruptcy would be diminished, and debtors, whose cases could be 
 
 132. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 764. 
 133. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). 
 134. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 764. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)). 
 138. See Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 23-24 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Olsen v. 
Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 915-16 (D. Or. 2006); Zelotes v. Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 22 (D. 
Conn. 2006), aff’d sub nom., Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 660 (D. Conn. 2007); infra 
Part III.C.1.b. 
 139. Under the Gentile test, the state must have a “legitimate interest.” Gentile v. 
State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991).  Under the strict scrutiny standard, the 
government must have a “compelling interest.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
 140. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
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dismissed because of bad faith filing.141  Section 526(a)(4), which 
targets loopholes and removes the incentives “that allow and sometimes 
even encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse,”142 advances 
BAPCPA’s rationale. 
None of the courts addressed whether this was a compelling143 or 
legitimate interest;144 rather, they addressed whether Congress narrowly 
drew the statute to serve that interest.145  Section 526(a)(4) prevents 
attorneys from advising their clients to incur any debt, including 
legitimate debt, in contemplation of bankruptcy.146  However, Congress 
failed to consider that incurring additional debt may not be a sign of 
“gaming” the system, but rather an appropriate reaction to the debtor’s 
financial distress.147  The prohibition could prevent a number of lawful 
and beneficial actions, including: (1) refinancing at a lower rate in order 
to lower payments and possibly delay or prevent bankruptcy; (2) 
incurring secured debt in order to establish credit after filing for 
bankruptcy; (3) taking out a loan to cover the expenses of bankruptcy, 
such as attorneys’ fees and filing fees; and (4) refinancing secured debt 
in order to pay off unsecured debt.148  A statute prohibiting attorneys 
from advising clients to take actions that could improve the possibility 
of a successful bankruptcy is not narrowly drawn to serve the 
government’s interest.149  Therefore, § 526(a)(4) is facially 
 141. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 765; Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 23 (citing Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1998: Part I: Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 25 (1998)). 
 142. Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 23 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), at 1 (2005), reprinted 
in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92). 
 143. Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must have a compelling interest 
to restrict speech. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000). 
 144. Under the Gentile test, the government must have a legitimate interest to 
restrict the speech of an attorney. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 
(1991). 
 145. Both tests require that the statute be narrowly drawn to serve the government 
interest. See supra notes 125, 133 and accompanying text. 
 146. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006). 
 147. See Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 24-25 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 765 (D. Minn. 2006); Olsen v. 
Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 916 (D. Or. 2006); Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 24. 
 148. See Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 24 (citing Hersh, 347 B.R. at 24; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 
916-17). 
 149. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
government could not justify a policy that threatened to punish a physician for 
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unconstitutional, irrespective of which standard is applied, because it 
chills the speech, or the advisement ability, of attorneys.150
2.  Section 527 
Section 527 requires attorneys to make specific statements to their 
clients. 151  Attorneys challenging this section have argued that it violates 
 
recommending to a patient the medical use of marijuana on the ground that such a 
recommendation might encourage illegal conduct by the patient); Hersh, 347 B.R. at 25 
(citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)) (even under intermediate scrutiny, 
“[s]tates may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially 
misleading information . . . if the information also may be presented in a way that is not 
deceptive”); Olsen, 350 B.R. at 916-17; Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 25. 
 150. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 25; Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 765-66; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 
916 (advocating that because the definition of debt relief agencies does not include non-
profits, debtors can still be advised on ways to “game” the system, rendering the section 
under-inclusive as well as over-inclusive); Zelotes, 352 B.R. at 25; Olsen Brief, supra 
note 122, at 16 (arguing that § 526(a)(4) is narrowly drawn because (1) it allows for 
attorneys to discuss the standards for determining when debt is abusive, and (2) it is 
merely a prohibition against advising clients from incurring more debt with an abusive 
intention). 
 151. 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2006).  Section 527 requires a debt relief agency providing 
bankruptcy assistance to an assisted person to provide each assisted person the 
following notice in writing: 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT BANKRUPTCY ASSISTANCE 
SERVICES FROM AN ATTORNEY OR BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER. 
 
If you decide to seek bankruptcy relief, you can represent yourself, you can hire an 
attorney to represent you, or you can get help in some localities from a bankruptcy 
petition preparer who is not an attorney.  THE LAW REQUIRES AN ATTORNEY 
OR BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER TO GIVE YOU A WRITTEN 
CONTRACT SPECIFYING WHAT THE ATTORNEY OR BANKRUPTCY 
PETITION PREPARER WILL DO FOR YOU AND HOW MUCH IT WILL COST. 
Ask to see the contract before you hire anyone. 
 
The following information helps you understand what must be done in a routine 
bankruptcy case to help you evaluate how much service you need.  Although 
bankrupty can be complex, many cases are routine. 
 
Before filing a bankruptcy case, either you or your attorney should analyze your 
eligibility for different forms of debt relief available under the Bankruptcy Code and 
which form of relief is most likely to be beneficial for you.  Be sure you understand 
the relief you can obtain and its limitations.  To file a bankruptcy case, documents 
called a Petition, Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs, as well as in some 
cases a Statement of Intention need to be prepared correctly and filed with the 
bankruptcy court.  You will have to pay a filing fee to the bankruptcy court.  Once 
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a professional’s First Amendment right not to speak.152  In other cases 
addressing the right of a professional not to speak, courts have applied a 
strict scrutiny standard.153
Two courts have addressed constitutional challenges to § 527,154 
and both held that § 527 passes constitutional muster under the strict 
scrutiny standard.155  Section 527 ensures that a client is informed of 
basic information before initiating a bankruptcy proceeding.156  Because 
consumer debtors are at an informational disadvantage, as compared to 
creditors, attorneys, and corporate debtors, a compelling government 
interest exists.157
The courts also held that the burden imposed by § 527 is 
reasonable.158  Because nothing in § 527 prevents the attorney from 
your case starts, you will have to attend the required first meeting of creditors where 
you may be questioned by a court official called a ‘trustee’ and by creditors. 
 
If you choose to file a chapter 7 case, you may be asked by a creditor to reaffirm a 
debt.  You may want help deciding whether to do so.  A creditor is not permitted to 
coerce you into reaffirming your debts. 
 
If you choose to file a chapter 13 case in which you repay your creditors what you can 
afford over 3 to 5 years, you may also want help with preparing your chapter 13 plan 
and with the confirmation hearing on your plan which will be before a bankruptcy 
judge. 
 
If you select another type of relief under the Bankruptcy Code other than chapter 7 or 
chapter 13, you will want to find out what should be done from someone familiar with 
that type of relief. 
 
Your bankruptcy case may also involve litigation.  You are generally permitted to 
represent yourself in litigation in bankruptcy court, but only attorneys, not bankruptcy 
petition preparers, can give you legal advice. 
Id. 
 152. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that First Amendment 
rights include both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speech); Hersh, 347 
B.R. at 26 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797-98 
(1988). 
 153. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882-83 (1992); Riley, 487 U.S. 
at 795-96 (this standard requires that the statute in question must (1) further a 
substantial government interest and (2) provide no “substantial obstacle” and not be an 
“undue burden”). 
 154. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 25-27; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 917-19. 
 155. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 27; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 918-19. 
 156. See Hersh, 347 B.R. at 27. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
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giving the debtor further explanation than that provided in the statute, 
the attorney would not be forced to provide false or misleading 
information.159  Additionally, the provision allows attorneys to alter the 
statement, so long as the content is “substantially similar.”160  A third 
factor making the burden “reasonable” is that the disclosures only need 
to be provided “to the extent applicable.”161  These flexibilities leave 
“the bankruptcy attorney with sufficient control of the distribution of the 
messages of the statement to avoid any undue burden.”162
The plaintiff in Hersh argued that § 527 creates an undue burden on 
attorneys because it requires them to make false or potentially 
misleading statements.163  This includes statements that clients “will 
have to pay a filing fee to the bankruptcy court,” even though such fees 
can be deferred under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006(b), 
and that the trustee is a “court official,” when the trustee is not employed 
by the court, but rather is selected by the Executive Branch.164  Plaintiff 
contended that because such disclosures are objectively incomplete or 
misleading or false, compelling attorneys to dispense this information is 
an obvious violation of their constitutional rights.165  Under Casey, 
mandating speech is unconstitutional if it requires the professional to 
make false or misleading statements.166  Therefore, plaintiff argued, 
because § 527 requires attorneys to make eleven false or misleading 
statements, it violates the First Amendment right to refrain from 
speech.167  No court has accepted these arguments.168
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2006)). 
 161. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2006)). 
 162. Id. (citing Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 532-34 (8th 
Cir. 1994)) (upholding a provision requiring doctors to provide information, where they 
may comment on or dissociate themselves from that information). 
 163. See Hersh Reply Brief, supra note 122, at 15-17. 
 164. See id. The plaintiff listed nine other false or misleading statements that a debt 
relief agency would be required to make if it complied with § 527. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992)). 
 167. See id. 
 168. See e.g., Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 27 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting 
the plaintiff’s arguments). 
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3.  Section 528 
Section 528 regulates debt relief agency advertisements by 
requiring them to include the phrase: “We are a debt relief agency.  We 
help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”169
Two courts heard challenges to this section, and their holdings 
conflict.170  Both initially evaluated which of three standards of 
constitutional evaluation should apply.171  All three standards require the 
evaluating court to first determine whether the First Amendment right to 
commercial speech protects the expression,172 and then assess the nature 
of that commercial speech.173  If the speech is found to be deceptive, it 
need only withstand a rational basis review.174  If the speech is not 
deceptive, the restriction must directly advance a substantial government 
interest.175  The courts in Milavetz and Olsen determined that 
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard to apply to § 528176 because 
the statute imposes requirements on both the false and deceptive 
advertisement of which Congress complains and on truthful 
advertisements.177  The intermediate scrutiny standard requires that the 
regulation (1) directly advance (2) a substantial government interest that 
is (3) “narrowly drawn.”178
The court in Milavetz held that § 528 violates attorneys’ First 
Amendment rights because the statute fails the first and third prongs of 
 
 169. 11 U.S.C. §§ 528(a)(4), (b)(2) (2006). 
 170. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 766 (D. 
Minn. 2006); Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 919 (D. Or. 2006). 
 171. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 766; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 919-20. 
 172. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980). 
 173. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 766. 
 174. See id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the S.Ct. of Ohio, 
471 U.S. 626, 651-52 (1985)). 
 175. See id. (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (1980)). 
 176. See id.; Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 920 (D. Or. 2006) (determining that 
rational basis review applied, but nevertheless proceeded to analyze the case under 
intermediate scrutiny, concluding that even this greater standard was satisfied by the 
facts). 
 177. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 766; Olsen, 350 B.R. at 919-20 (holding that the 
Zauderer decision is on point with the case at issue). 
 178. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 766 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Zauderer, 
471 U.S. at 641); Olsen, 305 B.R. at 919 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Bd. of 
Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)). 
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the intermediate scrutiny standard.179  The government interest concerns 
preventing debt relief agencies from misleading “the lay community into 
thinking debts can be erased without payment or filing for 
bankruptcy.”180  However, because the statute is likely to create more 
confusion, not less, the government’s interest is not advanced.181  The 
public does not know what a debt relief agency is, and is more likely to 
be confused by advertisements for this Congressionally-invented group 
(which has no real existence outside of the legislative imagination) than 
it would by advertisements for bankruptcy attorneys.182  Additionally, 
the statute forces all professionals that are debt relief agencies to 
advertise in the same way, regardless of whether they are qualified to 
practice law or only assist in the petition preparation process,183 thus 
compounding confusion.184
The Milavetz court, in addition to holding that § 528 does not 
directly advance the government’s interest, also held that this section is 
not “narrowly drawn.”185  “A narrowly drawn regulation designed to 
prevent deception ‘may be no broader than reasonably necessary to 
prevent the ‘perceived evil.’”186  The court concluded that Congress 
constructed § 528 far too broadly because it regulates “absolutely 
truthful advertisements,” which is unnecessary to satisfy the government 
interest.187
Conversely, the court in Olsen held that § 528 withstands 
constitutional scrutiny.188  It concluded that because the required 
language is neither illegal nor misleading, it advances the government 
interest of preventing fraudulent advertising by debt relief agencies.189  
The first two prongs of intermediate scrutiny are thus satisfied.190  The 
Olsen court found that Congress did narrowly draw the statute because, 
while it does require attorneys to advertise as debt relief agencies, it 
 179. See Milavetz, 355 B.R. at 767. 
 180. Id. at 766. 
 181. See id. at 767. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
 187. See id. 
 188. See Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 919-20 (D. Or. 2006). 
 189. See id. at 920 (citing 151 CONG. REC. H2063-01, 2066 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 
2005)). 
 190. See id. 
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does not limit them from also identifying themselves as bankruptcy 
attorneys.191  The forced inclusion of debt relief agencies simply 
provides more information.192  The court also addressed whether non-
debtor attorneys will be obligated to include this potentially misleading 
statement in advertisements, despite the fact that the debt relief agency 
designation arises only because of service provided to “assisted 
persons.”193  The court held that because § 528 allows professionals to 
make “substantially similar” statements and does not limit them from 
providing additional information in their advertisements, it is still 
narrowly drawn.194  As a result, the Olsen court found that the third 
prong of intermediate scrutiny was satisfied, and therefore upheld the 
constitutionality of § 528.195 
4.  Section 526(a)(1) 
Section 526(a)(1) provides that “[a] debt relief agency shall not fail 
to perform any service that such agency informed an assisted person or 
prospective assisted person it would provide in connection with a case or 
proceeding under this title . . . .”196  In Olsen, the plaintiffs argued that 
attorneys might be reluctant to tell clients or potential clients some 
details regarding the ramifications of representation, thus 
unconstitutionally chilling speech.197  The plaintiffs discussed several 
examples where an attorney might promise services, but later ethical or 
practical considerations would prevent performance.198  These concerns 
echo those voiced by scholars, who had previously addressed the 
potential chilling effect of the debt relief agency provisions, and who 
 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(1) (2007). 
 197. Olsen Brief, supra note 122, at 8-10. 
 198. See id. (examples cited include an attorney representing a married couple, 
making representations to both of them and then, due to their divorce, becoming unable 
to fulfill those obligations to one or both of them per the ethics rules; an attorney unable 
to fulfill his obligations because he feels as though his life is threatened by his client; 
and the situation of a debtor changing dramatically during the course of a bankruptcy 
case). 
468 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
described hypothetical situations in which an attorney’s adherence to 
professional responsibilities would induce violation of the statute.199
The Olsen court, unpersuaded,200 interpreted the statute consistently 
with the statutory construction doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and 
in a way that did not raise a question of constitutionality.  Olsen held 
that courts “should interpret this section to not require attorneys to 
perform ill-advised or unethical services.”201  It concluded that when an 
interpretation that does not violate the constitution is available, an as-
applied challenge should fail.202  The court found that “speech is not 
chilled by the provision,”203 because in the worst case, attorneys would 
be required to couch their promises in conditional terms, not abstain 
from communication entirely.204
III.  RESOLUTION 
 
A.  Attorneys Are Not Debt Relief Agencies 
 
1.  Debtor’s Attorneys
Notwithstanding the pre-implementation treatment of this issue by 
scholars,205 debtors’ attorneys are not debt relief agencies.  If courts 
interpret the definition of debt relief agencies to exclude attorneys, 
many, if not all, of the constitutional issues would disappear.206  This 
result complies with the requirement that courts choose the statutory 
construction that creates the fewest constitutional issues.207
The plain language of the statutory provisions at issue compels such 
a result.208  Despite Congressional denouncements of bankruptcy 
 
 199. See Vance, supra note 6, at 306-09 (discussing how the vagueness of the 
provision creates an obligation to clients that otherwise would not exist under either 
ethical rules or applicable law). 
 200. See Olsen, 350 B.R. at 916-17. 
 201. Id. at 917. 
 202. See id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 768 (D. 
Minn. 2006); supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
 208. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 526-528 (2007). 
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attorneys in the legislative history, the definition of a debt relief agency 
does not expressly include attorneys.209  Congress easily could have 
added attorneys to this definition, but did not.  Moreover, the legislative 
history reveals instances where attorneys and debt relief agencies are 
recognized as separate entities on the same list.210  The history also 
contains a separate list of attorney responsibilities, indicating that 
attorneys have responsibilities different from those of debt relief 
agencies.211
Lastly, the failure to incorporate Senator Feingold’s amendment,212 
which would have excluded attorneys from the definition of debt relief 
agency, is not persuasive evidence of Congressional intent to include 
attorneys.  First, Congress never specifically rejected this amendment.213  
Second, its failure to read the issue is better construed as an indication 
that Congress did not view the amendment as necessary, because 
attorneys are not included within the definition of debt relief agency, 
rather than that Congress affirmatively understood the term to include 
attorneys and declined the opportunity to carve out an exemption for 
attorneys. 
2.  Other Attorneys 
If debtors’ attorneys are not debt relief agencies, then attorneys for 
non-debtor “assisted persons” and pro bono attorneys are not debt relief 
agencies, either.214  Even if debtors’ attorneys are debt relief agencies, 
attorneys for other “assisted persons” should not be included within the 
scope of these provisions.  Since the most powerful argument in favor of 
debtors’ attorneys as debt relief agencies is the legislative history 
accusing attorneys of “gaming,”215 it is difficult to translate this 
argument to attorneys who do not represent debtors and, therefore, 
cannot mislead debtors or aid them in “gaming” the system. 
 
 209. See id. § 101(12A). 
 210. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 17, 44 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
88, 103, 116 (“S. 256 would impose private-sector mandates on bankruptcy attorneys, 
creditors, preparers of bankruptcy petitions, debt-relief agencies, consumer reporting 
agencies, and credit and charge-card companies.”). 
 211. See id. at 116. 
 212. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Wann, supra note 27, at 281 n.37. 
 214. The arguments about constitutional avoidance and plain language discussed 
above apply to all attorneys. 
 215. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
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On the other hand, if debtor’s attorneys are debt relief agencies, 
debtor’s attorneys working on a pro bono basis are also debt relief 
attorneys.216  The In re Reyes court held that pro bono attorneys are not 
debt relief agencies because they do not receive valuable consideration 
from the debtor in exchange for their services.217  The definition of debt 
relief agencies does not require that the debtor give valuable 
consideration, only that consideration is received in exchange for the 
services.218  Debtors’ attorneys, or any other debt relief agency, could 
simply receive payment directly from family members of the debtor, or 
from a bank where the debtor has taken a loan to cover bankruptcy 
expenses, to avoid all liability under §§ 526-528.  This loophole would 
render the debt relief agency provisions completely ineffective.  
Therefore, pro bono attorneys that represent debtors must be debt relief 
agencies if debtors’ attorneys are included in the definition. 
B.  If Attorneys are Debt Relief Agencies, §§ 526-528 are 
Unconstitutional 
A holding that attorneys are debt relief agencies triggers the second 
half of the debt relief agency debate, whether §§ 526-528 violate the 
constitutional rights of attorneys. 
1.  Section 526(a)(4) Violates Attorneys’ First Amendment Rights 
a.  Strict Scrutiny—The Applicable Standard 
Determining which First Amendment standard to apply to a 
statutory restriction on speech first requires a threshold determination of 
the type of restriction.219  If the restriction is content-based, then the 
strict scrutiny standard applies.220  If the restriction constitutes an ethical 
rule, the evaluating court should apply the Gentile standard.221  Section 
 
 216. From a public policy standpoint, such a holding would not be desirable since it 
discourages attorneys from engaging in pro bono work aimed at assisting consumer 
debtors as they are already experiencing financial difficulties. 
 217. See 361 B.R. 276, 280-81 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); supra notes 114-18 and 
accompanying text. 
 218. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2007). 
 219. See supra notes 123-40 and accompanying text. 
 220. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
 221. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). 
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526(a)(4) prevents attorneys from giving specific information to their 
clients.222  Therefore, it is a content-based restriction and strict scrutiny 
should apply.223  It is more likely that a court will find that the statute 
violated attorneys’ constitutional rights under a strict scrutiny standard 
than under the Gentile standard. 
b.  Section 526(a)(4) Violates Attorneys’ First Amendment Rights 
Regardless of the Applicable Standard 
Section 526(a)(4) fails constitutional scrutiny regardless of the 
standard applied, whether under the Gentile test or the strict scrutiny 
standard.  Both tests require that the statute be “narrowly drawn” in 
order to serve the government interest,224 and § 526(a)(4) is not narrowly 
drawn.  While it may serve the purposes set out by Congress,225 it would 
also prevent attorneys from providing lawful, appropriate advice to their 
clients.  There are several examples of proper incursion of additional 
debt prior to filing for bankruptcy, even in anticipation of filing for 
bankruptcy.226  Offering such advice would not be unlawful, unethical, 
or even encourage debtors to “game” the system.  Instead, it would aid 
all parties in a bankruptcy.227  Unfortunately, attorneys could not advise 
debtors accordingly if forced to comply with § 526(a)(4).  A statute 
prohibiting attorneys from advising clients to take actions that could 
improve the possibility of a successful bankruptcy is not narrowly 
drawn.  Therefore, it violates attorneys’ constitutional rights. 
 
 222. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 764 (D. 
Minn. 2006). 
 223. See id.; supra notes 132, 134-35 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra notes 125, 133 and accompanying text. 
 225. Among Congress’ stated purposes for BAPCPA was to curb the practice of 
debtors “gaming” the system, and to prevent their attorneys from helping them do so. 
See S. Res. 256, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. S2459 (2005) (enacted); supra notes 19-
25 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 916-917 (D. Or. 2006); Zelotes v. 
Martini, 352 B.R. 17, 24 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Zelotes v. Adams, 363 B.R. 
660 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19, 24 (N.D. Tex. 2006)). 
 227. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (discussing the positive effects 
of violation of this section). 
472 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
2.  Section 527 Violates Attorneys’ First Amendment Rights 
Section 527 violates attorneys’ First Amendment right to remain 
silent.228  While the government has a compelling interest in ensuring 
that an attorney inform the debtor of basic information before initiating a 
bankruptcy proceeding, the statute unduly burdens attorneys.229  Under 
Casey, a statute unconstitutionally violates speech if it requires a 
professional to make false or misleading statements.230  Section 527 
proscribes eleven mandatory statements that are false or misleading.231  
Thus, § 527 violates attorneys’ constitutional rights. 
3.  Section 528 Violates Attorneys’ First Amendment Rights, 
Notwithstanding Application of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard 
Milavetz and Olsen both addressed the constitutionality of § 528 
and held intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review.232  
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the statute directly advance a 
substantial government interest and to be drawn narrowly.233  Despite 
the use of this more lenient standard, § 528 is not constitutionally valid.  
Section 528 might confuse those reading debt relief agency 
advertisements, such that non-attorneys might be perceived as attorneys, 
and actual attorneys become de-professionalized.234  This confusion 
frustrates the government’s goal to protect against consumer deception.  
As a result, the statute fails the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny 
standard. 
 
 228. The First Amendment right to free speech includes both the right to speak and 
the right not to speak. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
797-98 (1988); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 229. A statute is only constitutionally valid if it furthers a substantial government 
interest and provides no substantial obstacle or undue burden. See Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882-83 (1992). 
 230. See id. at 883. 
 231. See Olsen Brief, supra note 122. 
 232. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States, 355 B.R. 758, 766 (D. 
Minn. 2006); Olsen v. Gonzales, 350 B.R. 906, 919 (D. Or. 2006). 
 233. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980). 
 234. See Lundin, supra note 6, at 69 (arguing that the debt relief agency provisions 
de-professionalize bankruptcy attorneys). 
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Further, § 528 is not narrowly drawn, as required by the third prong 
of the intermediate scrutiny standard.235  The regulation applies to all 
advertisements, even truthful ones.  Regulation of truthful 
advertisements, when such regulation does not achieve the government 
interest, violates attorneys’ First Amendment right to free speech. 
4.  Section 526(a)(1) Unconstitutionally Chills Attorney Speech 
Ethical and other considerations frequently arise, rendering 
attorneys unable to perform services for their clients.  Mandating 
attorneys to perform services absent exceptions will prevent attorneys 
from discussing the scope of their representation prior to the 
commencement of representation.  Had Congress included a phrase 
excusing attorneys when an ethical or other conflict arises, § 526(a)(1) 
would be valid.  However, because in the event of a conflict, the plain 
language of the text leaves attorneys with no option other than to violate 
BAPCPA and face sanctions, or violate ethical rules and face 
disciplinary action, attorneys will be reluctant to have open 
communication with their clients about the scope of the representation.  
Not only does this violate the attorneys’ First Amendment right to free 
speech, it also contradicts the rationale for BAPCPA—debtor 
protection.236
Olsen’s stipulation that courts “should interpret this section to not 
require attorneys to perform ill-advised or unethical services”237 
provides guidance for future courts, but does nothing to calm the fears of 
attorneys.  Section 526(a)(1) violates attorneys’ First Amendment rights 
because they cannot speak with clients in the legal and ethical way that, 
absent this provision, they otherwise could. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Any attorney that wishes to make a statement in violation of § 
526(a)(1) or (4), refrain from any statement in violation of § 527, or 
advertise in a manner that violates § 528, has standing to raise a 
constitutional challenge to the debt relief agency provisions of 
BAPCPA.  A court hearing that challenge should find that attorneys do 
not fall within the definition of debt relief agencies.  If the court does 
 
 235. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 236. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
 237. 350 B.R. 906, 917 (D. Or. 2006). 
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find that attorneys are debt relief agencies, it next must find that §§ 
526(a)(1), (4), 527, and 528 violate attorneys’ First Amendment right to 
free speech. 
 
